Any community in which membership is optional may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, cryptocurrencies, and federated governing bodies. Forking is typically the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority, and it is not always amicable. Forks usually come at a cost, and can be seen as consequences of collective decisions that destabilize the community. Here, we provide a social choice setting in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study this social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues and concerns of strategic agent behavior.

翻译：例如,叉子可能出现在政党、商业伙伴关系、社会团体、密码和联邦管理机构中。 叉子通常是非正式社会进程或受害少数有组织行动的产物,它并不总是友好的。 叉子通常要付出代价,并且可以被视为破坏社区稳定的集体决定的后果。 在这里,我们提供了一个社会选择环境,使代理人不仅可以报告对一套替代选择的偏好,而且可以报告面对分歧可能出现的潜在障碍。 我们研究这种社会选择环境,集中研究稳定问题和战略代理人行为的关切。