In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their strategies, indicating their preferred quantity at any given market price. Producers and consumers may wish to act as both, i.e., prosumers. In this paper, we examine the behavior of profit-maximizing prosumers in a uniform-price market for resource allocation with the objective of maximizing the social welfare. We propose a scalar-parameterized function bidding mechanism for the prosumers, in which we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we provide an efficient way to compute the Nash equilibrium through the computation of the market allocation at the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present a case study to illustrate the welfare loss under different variations of market parameters, such as the market's supply capacity and inelastic demand.

翻译：在统一价格市场中，供应商通过竞争向消费者提供资源，其竞争结果决定单一市场出清价格。为获得充分灵活性，生产者与消费者更倾向于采用函数形式作为投标策略，以表明其在任意给定市场价格下的期望交易量。生产者和消费者可能同时扮演两种角色，即成为产消者。本文研究了追求利润最大化的产消者在统一价格资源配置市场中的行为，以社会福利最大化为目标。我们提出了一种适用于产消者的标量参数化函数投标机制，并证明了该机制下纳什均衡的存在性与唯一性。进一步地，我们通过计算纳什均衡状态下的市场配置结果，提供了一种高效求解纳什均衡的方法。最后，通过案例研究阐明了不同市场参数（如市场供给能力与非弹性需求）变化对社会福利损失的影响。