Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of iterative plurality on the welfare of the chosen outcome at equilibrium, relative to the truthful vote profile, via an adaptation of the price of anarchy. However, prior analyses have only studied the worst-case and average-case performances when agents' preferences are distributed by the impartial culture. This work extends average-case analyses to a wider class of distributions and distinguishes when iterative plurality improves or degrades asymptotic welfare.

翻译：迭代投票是一种自然的重复策略决策模型，当个体在最终确定群体决策前有机会更新其投票时，该模型描述了社会选择中的策略行为。先前研究通过适配无政府价格的方法，分析了迭代投票在均衡状态下所选结果相对于真实投票配置的福利效率。然而，现有分析仅研究了在代理人偏好服从“中立文化”分布时的最坏情况及平均情况性能。本研究将平均情况分析扩展至更广泛的分布类别，并区分了迭代多数投票何时改善或恶化渐进福利。