In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but only through a worst-case lens. Instead, we study the expected distortion of voting rules with respect to an underlying distribution over voter utilities. Our main contribution is the design and analysis of a novel and intuitive rule, binomial voting, which provides strong expected distortion guarantees for all distributions.

翻译：在计算社会选择中，投票规则的扭曲度衡量该规则克服有限偏好信息以选择社会期望结果的程度。这一概念已被广泛研究，但始终局限于最坏情况分析。不同于此，我们基于底层偏好概率分布，研究投票规则的期望扭曲度。本文主要贡献在于设计并分析了一种新颖直观的规则——二项投票，该规则能为所有分布提供强期望扭曲保证。