We study the problem of fairly assigning a set of discrete tasks (or chores) among a set of agents with additive valuations. Each chore is associated with a start and finish time, and each agent can perform at most one chore at any given time. The goal is to find a fair and efficient schedule of the chores, where fairness pertains to satisfying envy-freeness up to one chore (EF1) and efficiency pertains to maximality (i.e., no unallocated chore can be feasibly assigned to any agent). Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an EF1 and maximal schedule for two agents under monotone valuations when the conflict constraints constitute an arbitrary interval graph. The algorithm uses a coloring technique in interval graphs that may be of independent interest. For an arbitrary number of agents with identical additive valuations, we show the existence of an EF1 and maximal schedule when the constraints constitute a path graph. This result uses a reduction to the ``cycle-plus-triangles'' theorem. Using different techniques, we provide an efficient algorithm for finding such a schedule when there are four or more agents and the valuations are further assumed to be dichotomous. We also show that stronger fairness and efficiency properties, including envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX) along with maximality and EF1 along with Pareto optimality, cannot be achieved.

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