Philosophical research in AI has hitherto largely focused on the ethics of AI. In this paper we, an ethicist of belief and a machine learning scientist, suggest that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI - the epistemology of AI, and in particular an ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief, a field that has been defined in various ways, to refer to a sub-field within epistemology. This subfield is concerned with the study of possible moral, practical, and other non-alethic dimensions of belief. And in this paper, we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents - both human and artificial - ought to believe, rather than with descriptive questions concerning whether certain beliefs meet various evaluative standards such as being true, being justified or warranted, constituting knowledge, and so on. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI; morally owed beliefs; pragmatic and moral encroachment on AI beliefs; and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven't yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.

翻译：迄今为止，哲学领域的人工智能研究主要聚焦于人工智能伦理。在本文中，我们——一位信念伦理学家与一位机器学习科学家——主张需要开拓人工智能哲学研究的新领域：人工智能认识论，尤其是人工智能信念伦理。此处将"信念伦理"（这一领域有多种定义方式）视为认识论的一个分支，其研究重点在于信念可能涉及的道德、实践及其他非真理维度。本文主要关注信念伦理中的规范性问题，即探讨智能体（包括人类与人工智能）应当相信什么，而非描述性问题（例如某些信念是否符合诸如真实性、确证性、合理性、构成知识等评价标准）。我们提出现有（人类）信念伦理研究中的四个主题可应用于人工智能信念伦理：人工智能的信念性错误、道德上应得的信念、实践与道德对人工智能信念的侵蚀、以及人工智能信念的道德责任。同时，我们指出两个尚处于萌芽阶段、尚未被普遍认可为人工智能信念伦理研究的哲学领域——人工智能的认知与伦理去殖民化、以及人工智能中的认知不公正——因其对信念道德与实践维度的探索，本质上属于该研究范畴。