The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.

翻译：大语言模型（LLMs）的快速发展加剧了关于其对语言学理论意义的争论。这些争论通常分为三种立场：绝缘主义，认为LLMs与人类语言无关；消除主义，声称LLMs可以取代传统语言学理论；以及调和主义，将其视为语言学研究的有用工具。为厘清这些立场，本文应用科学哲学中的模态建模框架。我们认为，即使缺乏与人类认知的结构对应，LLMs作为最小模型也具有真正的认识论价值。具体而言，它们能够通过测试关于语言习得和语言能力的模态主张，提供可能如何解释（HPEs）。随后，我们借鉴科学解释的机制论，考察LLMs有资格作为人类语言实际如何解释（HAEs）的条件。我们认为，当前LLMs尚不满足这些要求。基于此分析，我们提出将LLMs的解释力理解为处于HPEs与HAEs之间的连续统上。该框架既避免夸大也避免低估其解释意义，并为评估LLMs在语言科学研究中的作用提供了更精确的基础。