Safety assurance cases provide structured justifications that safety-critical systems meet their safety requirements. Recently, the notion of defeaters has emerged as a rigorous means of challenging the validity of safety arguments. Examples of defeaters might include overly strict claims, unreliable evidence, or reasoning gaps. However, defeaters remain ad hoc, lack structured support for critical reflection, are inconsistently described, are difficult to review, and lack documentation standards. To address this, we propose Defeater Cards, a new structured documentation artifact for systematically characterizing, reasoning about, and managing defeaters in safety cases. Drawing on a literature survey and thematic analysis, we identify documentation criteria that inform the card's structure, based on the 5W1H framework. Defeater Cards are designed to support informed analysis and evolution, improve traceability and auditability, and enable the reuse of defeater knowledge across systems and product variants. We demonstrate their applicability through two cross-domain case studies, showing how they expose hidden assumptions, surface reasoning gaps, and support ongoing safety assurance case evolution. To support adoption and community reuse, we also release an open-source repository of defeater cards as a baseline upon which researchers and practitioners can build and describe lessons learned.

翻译：暂无翻译