Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern cryptographic implementations and devices in recent years. Hence, how to prevent side-channel attacks on cryptographic devices has become an important problem. One of the widely used countermeasures to against power SCAs is the injection of random noise sequences into the raw leakage traces. However, the indiscriminate injection of random noise can lead to significant increases in energy consumption in device, and ways must be found to reduce the amount of energy in noise generation while keeping the side-channel invisible. In this paper, we propose an optimal energy-efficient design for artificial noise generation to prevent side-channel attacks. This approach exploits the sparsity among the leakage traces. We model the side-channel as a communication channel, which allows us to use channel capacity to measure the mutual information between the secret and the leakage traces. For a given energy budget in the noise generation, we obtain the optimal design of the artificial noise injection by solving the side-channel's channel capacity minimization problem. The experimental results also validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.

翻译：侧信道攻击（SCA）通过利用实现过程中的泄漏信息（如功耗）推断秘密信息（例如密钥），近年来已被证明是现代密码实现和设备的不可忽视威胁。因此，如何防止密码设备遭受侧信道攻击已成为重要问题。针对功耗型SCA的广泛对抗措施之一，是将随机噪声序列注入原始泄漏轨迹。然而，不加区分地注入随机噪声会导致设备能耗显著增加，因此必须在保持侧信道不可见性的同时，寻找降低噪声生成能耗的方法。本文提出一种最优的低能耗人工噪声生成设计方案，用于防止侧信道攻击。该方法利用泄漏轨迹间的稀疏性，将侧信道建模为通信信道，从而可使用信道容量度量秘密信息与泄漏轨迹间的互信息。在给定噪声生成能耗预算下，通过求解侧信道信道容量最小化问题，获得人工噪声注入的最优设计。实验结果验证了所提方案的有效性。