In crowdsourcing, a group of common people is asked to execute the tasks and in return will receive some incentives. In this article, one of the crowdsourcing scenarios with multiple heterogeneous tasks and multiple IoT devices (as task executors) is studied as a two-tiered process. In the first tier of the proposed model, it is assumed that a substantial number of IoT devices are not aware of the hiring process and are made aware by utilizing their social connections. Each of the IoT devices reports a cost (private value) that it will charge in return for its services. The participating IoT devices are rational and strategic. The goal of the first tier is to select the subset of IoT devices as initial notifiers so as to maximize the number of IoT devices notified with the constraint that the total payment made to the notifiers is within the budget. For this purpose, an incentive compatible mechanism is proposed. In the second tier, a set of quality IoT devices is determined by utilizing the idea of single-peaked preferences. The next objective of the second tier is to hire quality IoT devices for the floated tasks. For this purpose, each quality IoT device reports private valuation along with its favorite bundle of tasks. In the second tier, it is assumed that the valuation of the IoT devices satisfies gross substitute criteria and is private. For the second tier, the truthful mechanisms are designed independently for determining the quality IoT devices and for hiring them and deciding their payment respectively. Theoretical analysis is carried out for the two tiers independently and is shown that the proposed mechanisms are computationally efficient, truthful, correct, budget feasible, and individually rational. Further, the probabilistic analysis is carried out to estimate the expected number of IoT devices got notified about the task execution process.

翻译：在众包中，一群普通民众被要求执行任务，并相应获得激励。本文将多异构任务与多物联网设备（作为任务执行者）的众包场景作为两层过程进行研宄。在所提模型的第一层，假设大量物联网设备对雇佣流程不知情，需通过其社交关系了解相关信息。每台物联网设备会报告其为换取服务所收取的成本（私有价值）。参与物联网设备具有理性与战略性特征。第一层目标是在支付给通知者的总费用不超过预算的约束下，选择初始通知者子集以最大化被告知的物联网数量。为此提出一种激励相容机制。第二层利用单峰偏好思想确定高质量物联网设备集合，并进一步雇佣这些设备执行发布任务。每台高质量物联网设备需报告私有估值及其偏好的任务组合。该层假设物联网设备估值满足总替代性条件且具有私有性。独立设计了针对第二层高质量设备甄别、雇佣及报酬支付的诚实机制。对两层分别进行理论分析，证明所提机制具有计算高效性、诚实性、正确性、预算可行性与个体理性。此外，通过概率分析估算了获知任务执行流程的物联网设备期望数量。