We propose a game-theoretic framework to study the outcomes of packetized payments, a cross-ledger transaction protocol, with strategic and possibly malicious agents. We derive the transaction failure rate and demonstrate that without disciplinary mechanisms, packetized payments are likely to be incomplete. Our analysis suggests that collateral deposits can prevent malicious agents from taking advantage of the protocol. We further infer that the deposit amount should depend on the underlying asset price volatility or that it should be dynamically adjusted as the price changes.

翻译：我们提出一个游戏理论框架,以研究分包付款的结果,一个跨层交易协议,有战略性的和可能的恶意代理人。 我们得出交易失败率,并表明如果没有纪律机制,分包付款很可能是不完整的。 我们的分析表明,抵押存款可以防止恶意代理人利用协议。 我们还推断,存款数额应该取决于潜在的资产价格波动,或者应该根据价格变化动态调整。