In this article, we propose a new form of DAO governance that uses a sequential auction mechanism to overcome entrenched control issues that have emerged for DAOs by creating a regime of temporary contestable control. The mechanism avoids potential public choice problems inherent in voting approaches but at the same time provides a vehicle that can enhance and secure value than inheres to DAO voting and other DAO non-market governance procedures. It is robust to empty voting and is code feasible. It facilitates the ability of DAOs to meet their normative and operational goals in the face of diverse regulatory approaches. Designed to shift control to the party with the most promising business plan, at the same time it distributes surplus in a way that tends to promote investment by other parties.

翻译：本文提出了一种新型DAO治理形式，该形式通过建立临时可竞争控制机制，采用顺序拍卖方式来解决DAO中出现的根深蒂固的控制问题。该机制避免了投票方法固有的潜在公共选择问题，同时提供了一种能够增强并保障DAO投票及其他DAO非市场治理程序内在价值的载体。它对空头投票具有鲁棒性，且代码可实现。在面对多样化的监管方式时，它有助于DAO实现其规范性和操作性目标。该机制旨在将控制权转移至拥有最具前景商业方案的一方，同时以促进其他各方投资的方式分配剩余价值。