We study a screening problem in which an agent privately knows which actions or technologies are feasible and can disclose only a subset to a principal. Once disclosed, feasible options are verifiable and their payoff consequences are publicly known, so private information concerns feasibility rather than payoffs, misreporting restricts the principal's choices directly rather than distorting her beliefs. Assuming feasible sets are ordered by inclusion, we establish a simple characterization of the optimal mechanism, where the principal either behaves as if there is no asymmetric information or locally provides no reward for better proposals. We derive comparative statics and illustrate the framework in applications to managing persuasion, action elicitation, and production-technology elicitation.

翻译：我们研究了一个筛选问题，其中代理人私下知晓哪些行动或技术是可行的，且只能向委托人披露一个子集。一旦披露，可行选项是可验证的，其收益结果也是公开已知的，因此私人信息涉及可行性而非收益，虚报会直接限制委托人的选择而非扭曲其信念。在假设可行集按包含关系排序的条件下，我们建立了最优机制的简单刻画：委托人要么表现得仿佛不存在信息不对称，要么对更好的提议局部地不提供奖励。我们推导了比较静态分析，并在应用于管理说服、行动激发和生产技术激发等场景中说明了该框架。