Prior beliefs are central to Bayesian accounts of cognition, but many of these accounts do not directly measure priors. More specifically, initial states of belief heavily influence how new information is assumed to be utilized when updating a particular model. Despite this, prior and posterior beliefs are either inferred from sequential participant actions or elicited through impoverished means. We had participants play a version of the game "Plinko", to first elicit individual participant priors in a theoretically agnostic manner. Subsequent learning and updating of participant beliefs was then directly measured. We show that participants hold a variety of priors that cluster around prototypical probability distributions that in turn influence learning. In follow-up experiments we show that participant priors are stable over time and that the ability to update beliefs is influenced by a simple environmental manipulation (i.e. a short break). This data reveals the importance of directly measuring participant beliefs rather than assuming or inferring them as has been widely done in the literature to date. The Plinko game provides a flexible and fecund means for examining statistical learning and mental model updating.

翻译：先前的信仰是巴耶斯人的认知账户的核心,但许多这类账户并不直接衡量前科。更具体地说,最初的信仰状态严重影响了在更新特定模式时如何假定使用新信息。尽管如此,先前和后科信仰要么是从连续参与者的行动中推断出来的,要么是通过贫困手段获得的。我们让参与者玩游戏“Plinko”的版本,首先以理论上不可知的方式获得个别参与者的先科;随后直接测量了随后对参与者信仰的学习和更新情况。我们显示参与者拥有各种前科,这些前科围绕原型概率分布进行分组,反过来影响学习。在后续实验中,我们显示参与者的前科是稳定的,更新信仰的能力受到简单的环境操纵的影响(即短暂的断裂 ) 。 这些数据显示了直接衡量参与者信仰而不是像迄今在文献中已经广泛做到的那样假设或推断的重要性。 Plinko游戏为审查统计学习和精神模式更新提供了灵活和Fecund手段。