Local fine-tuning datasets routinely contain sensitive secrets such as API keys, personal identifiers, and financial records. Although "local offline fine-tuning" is often viewed as a privacy boundary, we reveal that compromised model code is sufficient to steal them. Current passive pretrained-weight poisoning attacks, while effective for natural language, fundamentally fail to capture such sparse high-entropy targets due to their reliance on probabilistic semantic prefixes. To bridge this gap, we identify and exploit a practical but overlooked supply-chain vector -- malicious model code camouflaged as standard architectural definitions to realize a paradigm shift from passive weight poisoning to active execution hijacking. We introduce a deterministic full-chain memorization mechanism: it locks onto token-level secrets in dynamic computation flows via online tensor-rule matching, and leverages value-gradient decoupling to stealthily inject attack gradients, overcoming gradient drowning to force model memorization. Furthermore, we achieve, for the first time, attacker-verifiable secret stealing through black-box queries that precisely distinguishes true leakage from hallucination. Our attack achieves over 98% Strict ASR in the default LoRA setting with limited primary-task utility degradation and effectively evades defense measures including semantic safety filtering, code auditing, and perplexity-based detection.

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