Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a promising technology that allows groups of vehicles to form in automated tightly-coupled platoons. CACC schemes exploit Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communications to exchange kinematic information among adjacent vehicles. However, the use of communication networks brings security concerns as cyberattacks could access the vehicles' internal networks and computers to disrupt their operation and even cause crashes. In this manuscript, we present a sensitivity analysis of standard CACC schemes against a class of resource-limited attacks. We present a modelling framework that allows us to systematically compute outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets induced by attacks. We use the size of these sets as a security metric to quantify the potential damage of attacks entering the dynamics at different points and study how two key system parameters (sampling and headway constant) change these metrics. We carry out the latter sensitivity analysis for two different controller implementations (as given the available sensors there is an infinite number of realizations of the same controller) and show how different implementations can significantly affect the impact of attacks. We present extensive simulation experiments to illustrate our ideas.

翻译：协作式自适应巡航控制（CACC）是一项具有前景的技术，可使车辆群形成自动化的紧密耦合队列。CACC方案利用车对车（V2V）无线通信，在相邻车辆间交换运动学信息。然而，通信网络的使用带来了安全隐患，因为网络攻击可能侵入车辆内部网络和计算机，破坏其运行甚至引发碰撞。本文针对标准CACC方案，开展了一类资源受限攻击的灵敏度分析。我们提出一个建模框架，可系统计算攻击所引发可达集的外部椭球近似。以这些集合的尺寸作为安全度量指标，量化从动力学系统不同位置注入攻击的潜在危害，并研究两个关键系统参数（采样周期和车头时距常数）如何改变这些指标。针对两种不同的控制器实现方式（因可用传感器不同，同一控制器存在无限多种实现形式），我们开展了后者参数的灵敏度分析，并证明不同实现方式会显著影响攻击效果。最后通过大量仿真实验验证了我们的分析结论。