In this paper we deal with production situations where a cap or limit to the amount of greenhouse gas emissions permitted is imposed. Fixing a tax for each ton of pollutant emitted is also considered. We use bankruptcy rules to define cooperative games with externalities associated with these situations and analyze the existence of coalitionally stable allocations of the emission permits. We prove that the constrained equal awards ( CEA ) rule provides stable allocations and as a direct mechanism, it is incentive compatible. These two facts have interesting managerial implications to control pollution emissions.

翻译：本文探讨了在设定温室气体排放总量限额（上限）的生产情境，并考虑了每吨污染物排放征税的问题。我们运用破产规则定义了与这些情境相关且具有外部性的合作博弈，并分析了排放许可分配在联盟层面上的稳定性。我们证明，约束等额奖励（CEA）规则能够提供稳定的分配方案，且作为一种直接机制，其具有激励相容性。这两个事实对于控制污染物排放具有重要的管理启示。