In this paper, we present novel secret key distribution protocols using low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers. The secret keys are derived based on the timers' physical dynamic responses which provide security against any potential side-channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. Using the behavioral model of the self-powered timers, we first show that the key-strings derived from the timers can pass the randomness test as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) suite. The key-strings are then used in two key exchange protocols which exploit elapsed time as one-way functions. The protocols proposed in this paper facilitate secure communication between (a) a user and a remote Server; and (b) two users. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we investigate the scalability and the security of these protocols against different adversarial attacks. We also investigate the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and we investigate the use of error-correcting codes to mitigate noise-related artifacts.

翻译：在本文中,我们提出新的秘密关键分配协议,使用低成本的硬件芯片,含有数以百万计的同步自动计时器。秘密钥匙是根据定时器的物理动态反应而衍生的,这些反应为防范任何可能的侧道攻击、恶意篡改或窥探提供了安全。我们首先使用自动定时器的行为模型,我们首先表明从定时器中得出的关键字符串可以通过国家标准和技术研究所(NIST)套件定义的随机性测试。键字符串随后用于两个关键交换协议中,将过长的时间用作单向功能。本文中提议的协议有助于(a) 用户和远程服务器之间的安全通信;(b) 两个用户。我们利用蒙特-卡洛模拟,调查这些协议在现实世界操作条件下的可扩展性和安全性。我们还调查这些协议在现实世界操作条件下的稳健性,并调查使用错误校正代码来减少与噪音有关的文物。