Industrial Control Systems (ICS) underpin the United States' critical infrastructure, managing essential services such as power, water, and transportation that are vital to national security and public safety. However, increasing digital integration has exposed these systems to escalating cyber threats. Historical attacks like Stuxnet and the Ukraine power grid incident revealed exploitable weaknesses-poor network segmentation, outdated software, weak authentication, and inadequate monitoring-that persist in many U.S. ICS environments today. This paper analyzes these landmark attacks to identify recurring vulnerabilities and assess their relevance to current U.S. infrastructure. It argues that without immediate reforms, similar exploits could lead to catastrophic disruptions and national security crises. To address these risks, the paper proposes policy measures focused on implementing zero-trust architecture and improved network segmentation to enhance system resilience. These recommendations aim to guide policymakers and industry leaders in securing the nation's most critical operational technologies against future cyber threats.

翻译：工业控制系统（ICS）是美国关键基础设施的核心，负责管理电力、供水、交通等对国家安保与公共安全至关重要的基础服务。然而，日益深入的数字化整合使这些系统面临不断升级的网络威胁。Stuxnet病毒攻击与乌克兰电网事件等历史性案例揭示了当前美国众多ICS环境中仍普遍存在的可被利用的薄弱环节——包括网络分区不足、软件过时、身份验证薄弱及监控机制缺失。本文通过剖析这些标志性攻击事件，识别反复出现的系统脆弱性，并评估其与美国现有基础设施的相关性。研究指出，若不立即实施改革，类似的漏洞利用可能导致灾难性运行中断与国家安全危机。为应对这些风险，本文提出以实施零信任架构与强化网络分区为核心的政策措施，以提升系统韧性。这些建议旨在为政策制定者与行业领袖提供指引，从而保障国家最关键运营技术免受未来网络威胁的侵害。