In 2021 Ethereum adjusted the transaction pricing mechanism by implementing EIP-1559, which introduces the base fee - a fixed network fee per block that is burned and adjusted dynamically in accordance with network demand. The authors of the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) noted that a miner with more than 50% of the mining power might have an incentive to deviate from the honest mining strategy. Instead, such a miner could propose a series of empty blocks to increase its future rewards. In this paper, we generalize this attack and show that under rational player behavior, deviating from the honest strategy can be profitable for a miner with less than 50% of the mining power. Further, even when miners do not collaborate, it is rational for smaller mining power miners to join the attack.

翻译：2021年，以太坊通过实施EIP-1559调整了交易定价机制，该机制引入了基础费用——即每个区块中固定且被销毁的网络费用，并根据网络需求动态调整。以太坊改进提案的作者指出，拥有超过50%算力的矿工可能存在偏离诚实挖矿策略的动机。具体而言，此类矿工可通过提出一系列空区块来增加其未来收益。本文对该攻击进行泛化分析，并证明在理性参与者行为假设下，算力低于50%的矿工实施偏离诚实策略同样可以获利。进一步地，即使矿工之间不合作，较小算力的矿工理性选择仍会参与该攻击。