We study the universal coding under side-channel attacks posed and investigated by Santoso and Oohama (2019). They proposed a theoretical security model for Shannon cipher system under side-channel attacks, where the adversary is not only allowed to collect ciphertexts by eavesdropping the public communication channel, but is also allowed to collect the physical information leaked by the devices where the cipher system is implemented on such as running time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc. For any distributions of the plain text, any noisy channels through which the adversary observe the corrupted version of the key, and any measurement device used for collecting the physical information, we can derive an achievable rate region for reliability and security such that if we compress the ciphertext using an affine encoder with rate within the achievable rate region, then: (1) anyone with secret key will be able to decrypt and decode the ciphertext correctly, but (2) any adversary who obtains the ciphertext and also the side physical information will not be able to obtain any information about the hidden source as long as the leaked physical information is encoded with a rate within the rate region.

翻译：我们研究了Santoso与Oohama（2019）提出并探讨的侧信道攻击下的通用编码问题。他们针对香农密码系统在侧信道攻击下提出了一种理论安全模型，在该模型中，攻击者不仅允许通过窃听公共通信信道收集密文，还允许收集密码系统所实现设备泄露的物理信息（如运行时间、功耗、电磁辐射等）。对于任意明文分布、攻击者观测密钥受损版本所经过的任意噪声信道、以及用于收集物理信息的任意测量设备，我们均可导出可靠性与安全性的可达速率区域。若采用该速率区域内的仿射编码器对密文进行压缩，则：（1）任何持有密钥者均能正确解密并译码；（2）只要泄露的物理信息采用速率区域内的速率进行编码，任何获取密文及侧物理信息的攻击者均无法获得关于隐藏信源的任何信息。