Information sharing among competing suppliers can improve decision-making under uncertainty, yet strategic concerns regarding rival exploitation often deter voluntary disclosure. We study information-sharing mechanisms in a Cournot oligopoly with uncertain demand, where a platform aggregates suppliers' signals through privacy-preserving channels and may also possess an exogenous external signal. The central challenge is to balance strategic safety with informational utility: privacy noise reduces the exposure of individual signals, but also lowers the value of the shared information pool. We first characterize a baseline setting in which access to aggregated information is contingent on participation. In a two-firm market without an external signal, firms refuse to share regardless of the privacy level. In an \(n\)-firm market, sharing may arise even without privacy safeguards because non-participating firms lose access to the aggregated signal. Building on this baseline, we show that privacy protection alone is insufficient to incentivize disclosure; it must be combined with a sufficiently informative external signal. We further show that firms with more accurate private signals require stronger privacy protection. Overall, our results characterize the sharing-feasible region and highlight the complementarity between privacy design and the external information environment.

翻译：在不确定性下，竞争供应商之间的信息共享能够改善决策制定，然而关于竞争对手利用信息的战略顾虑常常阻碍自愿披露。我们研究了一个面临需求不确定性的古诺寡头市场中的信息共享机制，其中平台通过隐私保护渠道聚合供应商信号，并可能同时拥有一个外源外部信号。核心挑战在于平衡战略安全性与信息效用：隐私噪声降低了个体信号的暴露程度，但也削弱了共享信息池的价值。我们首先刻画了一个基准设定，即对聚合信息的访问以参与为条件。在无外部信号的双企业市场中，无论隐私保护水平如何，企业均拒绝共享。在 \(n\) 企业市场中，即使没有隐私保护措施也可能出现共享，因为未参与企业将失去对聚合信号的访问权限。基于这一基准，我们证明仅有隐私保护不足以激励披露；必须结合一个信息充分的外部信号。我们进一步表明，拥有更精确私有信号的企业需要更强的隐私保护。总体而言，我们的结果刻画了共享可行域，并凸显了隐私设计与外部信息环境之间的互补性。