Widespread adoption and growing popularity of embedded/IoT/CPS devices make them attractive attack targets. On low-to-mid-range devices, security features are typically few or none due to various constraints. Such devices are thus subject to malware-based compromise. One popular defensive measure is Remote Attestation (RA) which allows a trusted entity to determine the current software integrity of an untrusted remote device. For higher-end devices, RA is achievable via secure hardware components. For low-end (bare metal) devices, minimalistic hybrid (hardware/software) RA is effective, which incurs some hardware modifications. That leaves certain mid-range devices (e.g., ARM Cortex-A family) equipped with standard hardware components, e.g., a memory management unit (MMU) and perhaps a secure boot facility. In this space, seL4 (a verified microkernel with guaranteed process isolation) is a promising platform for attaining RA. HYDRA made a first step towards this, albeit without achieving any verifiability or provable guarantees. This paper picks up where HYDRA left off by constructing a PARseL architecture, that separates all user-dependent components from the TCB. This leads to much stronger isolation guarantees, based on seL4 alone, and facilitates formal verification. In PARseL, We use formal verification to obtain several security properties for the isolated RA TCB, including: memory safety, functional correctness, and secret independence. We implement PARseL in F* and specify/prove expected properties using Hoare logic. Next, we automatically translate the F* implementation to C using KaRaMeL, which preserves verified properties of PARseL C implementation (atop seL4). Finally, we instantiate and evaluate PARseL on a commodity platform -- a SabreLite embedded device.
翻译:嵌入式/物联网/信息物理系统设备的广泛采用和日益普及使其成为有吸引力的攻击目标。在中低端设备上,由于各种限制,安全功能通常很少或根本没有。因此,此类设备易受基于恶意软件的入侵。一种流行的防御措施是远程认证(RA),它允许可信实体确定不受信任远程设备的当前软件完整性。对于高端设备,RA可通过安全硬件组件实现。对于低端(裸机)设备,极简混合(硬件/软件)RA是有效的,但需要一些硬件修改。这给某些配备标准硬件组件的中端设备(例如ARM Cortex-A系列,配备内存管理单元(MMU)和安全启动功能)留下了空间。在此领域,seL4(一种经过验证、保证进程隔离的微内核)是实现RA的有前景平台。HYDRA朝此方向迈出了第一步,但未实现任何可验证性或可证明的保证。本文从HYDRA的成果出发,构建了PARseL架构,将所有用户相关组件与可信计算基(TCB)分离。这基于seL4本身实现了更强的隔离保证,并促进了形式化验证。在PARseL中,我们使用形式化验证为隔离的RA TCB获取多项安全属性,包括:内存安全性、功能正确性和秘密独立性。我们用F*语言实现PARseL,并使用Hoare逻辑指定/证明预期属性。接着,我们通过KaRaMeL将F*实现自动翻译为C语言,保留了PARseL(基于seL4的)C实现的已验证属性。最后,我们在商业平台——SabreLite嵌入式设备上实例化并评估了PARseL。