We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs. Gately's solution concept is well-defined for a broad class of games. We also consider a generalisation based on a parameter-based quantification of the propensity to disrupt. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship of these generalised Gately values with the Core and the Nucleolus and show that Gately's solution is in the Core for all regular 3-player games. We identify exact conditions under which generally these Gately values are Core imputations for arbitrary regular cooperative games. Finally, we investigate the relationship of the Gately value with the Shapley value.

翻译：本文研究了具有可转移效用的合作博弈中的Gately解概念。Gately概念引入了一种议价解，该解最小化玩家在集体收益分配过程中最大量化的“破坏倾向”。对于一大类博弈，Gately解概念是良定义的。我们还考虑了一种基于参数化破坏倾向量化的推广形式。此外，我们研究了这些广义Gately值与核和核仁之间的关系，并证明对于所有正则三人博弈，Gately解均位于核内。我们确定了在任意正则合作博弈下，这些Gately值作为核分配的一般确切条件。最后，我们探讨了Gately值与Shapley值之间的关系。