Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising solution to the scalability problem of cryptocurrencies. Any two users connected by a payment channel in the network can theoretically send an unbounded number of instant, costless transactions between them. Users who are not directly connected can also transact with each other in a multi-hop fashion. In this work, we study the incentive structure behind the creation of payment channel networks, particularly from the point of view of a single user that wants to join the network. We define a utility function for a new user in terms of expected revenue, expected fees, and the cost of creating channels, and then provide constant factor approximation algorithms that optimise the utility function given a certain budget. Additionally, we take a step back from a single user to the whole network and examine the parameter spaces under which simple graph topologies form a Nash equilibrium.

翻译：支付通道网络（PCNs）是解决加密货币可扩展性问题的一种有前景的方案。网络中通过支付通道相连的任意两个用户理论上可以进行无限次即时、零成本的交易。未直接相连的用户也可通过多跳方式相互交易。本文从单个用户加入网络的角度出发，研究支付通道网络创建背后的激励机制。我们根据预期收益、预期费用以及通道创建成本定义了新用户的效用函数，并提供了在给定预算下优化该效用函数的常数因子近似算法。此外，我们将视角从单个用户拓展至整个网络，考察了简单图拓扑结构构成纳什均衡时的参数空间。