Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often defended in the same manner as information technology (IT) systems -- by using perimeter security. Multiple factors make such defenses insufficient for CPS. Resiliency shows potential in overcoming these shortfalls. Techniques for achieving resilience exist; however, methods and theory for evaluating resilience in CPS are lacking. We argue that such methods and theory should assist stakeholders in deciding where and how to apply design patterns for resilience. Such a problem potentially involves tradeoffs between different objectives and criteria, and such decisions need to be driven by traceable, defensible, repeatable engineering evidence. Multi-criteria resiliency problems require a system-oriented approach that evaluates systems in the presence of threats as well as potential design solutions once vulnerabilities have been identified. We present a systems-oriented view of cyber-physical security, termed Mission Aware, that is based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.

翻译：利用周边安全,往往以与信息技术系统相同的方式捍卫网络-物理系统(CPS) -- -- 使用周边安全,多种因素使这种防御对CPS来说是不足的。弹性表明克服这些不足的潜力。实现复原力的技术是存在的;但是,在CPS中缺乏评估复原力的方法和理论。我们认为,这种方法和理论应有助于利益攸关方决定在何处和如何应用抗御能力设计模式。这种问题可能涉及不同目标和标准之间的取舍,这种决定需要由可追踪、可辩驳、可重复的工程证据来驱动。多标准弹性问题需要以系统为导向的方法,在出现威胁时对系统进行评估,并在发现弱点后对潜在设计解决方案进行评估。我们提出一个以系统为导向的网络-物理安全观点,称为 " 了解使命 ",其基础是对任务目标、系统动态和风险的全面理解。