Service Level Agreement (SLA) monitoring in service-oriented environments suffers from inherent trust conflicts when providers self-report metrics, creating incentives to underreport violations. We introduce a framework for generating verifiable SLA violation claims through trusted hardware monitors and zero-knowledge proofs, establishing cryptographic foundations for genuine trustworthiness in service ecosystems. Our approach starts with machine-readable SLA clauses converted into verifiable predicates and monitored within Trusted Execution Environments. These monitors collect timestamped telemetry, organize measurements into Merkle trees, and produce signed attestations. Zero-knowledge proofs aggregate Service-Level Indicators to evaluate compliance, generating cryptographic proofs verifiable by stakeholders, arbitrators, or insurers in disputes, without accessing underlying data. This ensures three security properties: integrity, authenticity, and validity. Our prototype demonstrates linear scaling up to over 1 million events per hour for measurements with near constant-time proof generation and verification for single violation claims, enabling trustless SLA enforcement through cryptographic guarantees for automated compliance verification in service monitoring.

翻译：面向服务的环境中的服务水平协议监控在提供商自行报告指标时存在固有的信任冲突，这为少报违规行为提供了动机。我们引入了一个框架，通过可信硬件监控器和零知识证明生成可验证的SLA违规声明，为服务生态系统中的真实可信性建立密码学基础。我们的方法从将机器可读的SLA条款转换为可验证谓词开始，并在可信执行环境中进行监控。这些监控器收集带时间戳的遥测数据，将测量结果组织成默克尔树，并生成签名证明。零知识证明聚合服务水平指标以评估合规性，生成可由利益相关者、仲裁员或保险人在争议中验证的密码学证明，而无需访问底层数据。这确保了三个安全属性：完整性、真实性和有效性。我们的原型展示了每小时处理超过100万个事件的线性扩展能力，测量过程具有近乎恒定时间的证明生成和验证，适用于单个违规声明，从而通过密码学保证实现无信任的SLA执行，用于服务监控中的自动化合规验证。