In this paper, we investigate the computational hardness of finding fractional allocations to unit-demand players using competitive equilibria from equal incomes (CEEI), where we allow a small constant error in players' response to market prices (also known as an approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium). We show that assuming the $\mathbf{(\varepsilon,δ)}$-Generalized Circuits problem is PPAD-hard (the "PCP-for-PPAD" conjecture), finding an approximate HZ equilibrium is also PPAD-hard. This result provides additional motivation for trying to prove the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture as a tool for obtaining robust computational hardness results about markets. Further, we introduce a natural restriction on approximate HZ equilibria, where players' bundles may still only be approximately optimal given the prices, but may not contain positive-price items for which the player has zero utility. We show unconditionally that there exists a constant $ε$ such that finding a restricted $ε$-HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.

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