Using data from 35 Participatory Budgeting instances in Amsterdam, we empirically compare two different Participatory Budgeting rules: the greedy cost welfare rule and the Method of Equal Shares. We quantify how proportional, equal and fair the rules are and conclude that, for a small price in total voter satisfaction, the Method of Equal Shares performs better on all notions of fairness studied. We further provide a popular and a visual explanation of the Method of Equal Shares.

翻译：基于阿姆斯特丹35个参与式预算实例的数据，我们实证比较了两种不同的参与式预算规则：贪婪成本福利规则与等额分配法。我们量化了这两种规则的成比例性、平等性与公平性，并得出结论：以选民总体满意度小幅下降为代价，等额分配法在所研究的所有公平性指标上均表现更优。此外，我们提供了对等额分配法通俗易懂的直观解释。