We describe and analyze perishing mining, a novel block-withholding mining strategy that lures profit-driven miners away from doing useful work on the public chain by releasing block headers from a privately maintained chain. We then introduce the dual private chain (DPC) attack, where an adversary that aims at double spending increases its success rate by intermittently dedicating part of its hash power to perishing mining. We detail the DPC attack's Markov decision process, evaluate its double spending success rate using Monte Carlo simulations. We show that the DPC attack lowers Bitcoin's security bound in the presence of profit-driven miners that do not wait to validate the transactions of a block before mining on it.

翻译：本文描述并分析了“消亡挖矿”这一新型区块扣留挖矿策略，该策略通过从私有维护链中释放区块头，诱使追求利润的矿工停止在公有链上进行有效工作。我们随后提出了“双私有链”（DPC）攻击，在这种攻击中，旨在实现双花攻击的对手通过间歇性地将其部分算力投入消亡挖矿来提高攻击成功率。我们详细阐述了DPC攻击的马尔可夫决策过程，并通过蒙特卡洛模拟评估了其双花攻击成功率。研究表明，在存在利益驱动型矿工（其不等待验证区块中的交易即开始挖矿）的情况下，DPC攻击降低了比特币的安全边界。