We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about voters' approval preferences. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved, and unknown candidates, possibly with ordinal preference constraints among candidates in the latter category. For a number of classic approval-based committee voting rules including Chamberlin--Courant and Proportional Approval Voting, we study the complexity of some fundamental computational problems such as determining whether a given committee is a possible or necessary winning committee and whether it possibly or necessarily satisfies representation axioms.

翻译：我们调查以批准为基础的委员会投票,但关于选民批准选择的信息不完全。 我们考虑几种不完全的模式,即每个选民将一组候选人分成核准、不核准和未知候选人,可能后一类候选人受到常规偏好限制。 对于一些传统的以批准为基础的委员会投票规则,包括Camberlin-Courant和比例批准投票,我们研究一些基本计算问题的复杂性,例如确定某个委员会是否可能或有必要胜选,以及它是否可能或必然满足代表原则。