We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly ``flipped,'' so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursuing efficiency, and mitigating the effect of noise on revenue.

翻译：我们研究了在个体代理人报告偏好经过噪声隐私保护变换后的公共物品供给机制设计问题。该设定采用标准二元模型，包含转移支付与拟线性效用函数。代理人报告其对公共物品的偏好，这些报告会被随机"翻转"，使得任何个体报告均可归因于噪声结果。我们分析了以下三方面的权衡关系：在噪声环境下维持公共决策的稳健性（噪声敏感性）、追求效率提升、以及减轻噪声对收益的影响。