In many real world situations, like minor traffic offenses in big cities, a central authority is tasked with periodic administering punishments to a large number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller fine and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the individual risk is typically small and a rational individual will not choose to pay the fine. Here we show that if the central authority processes the offenders in a publicly known order, it properly incentives the offenders to pay the fine. We show analytically and on realistic experiments that our mechanism promotes non-cooperation and incentives individuals to pay. Moreover, the same holds for an arbitrary coalition. We quantify the expected total payment the central authority receives, and show it increases considerably.

翻译：在许多现实场景中，例如大城市中的轻微交通违规行为，中央管理部门需要定期对大量个体实施惩罚。常见的做法是让每个个体有机会缴纳较小罚款，从而保证避免可能面临更严厉处罚的法律程序。然而，由于违法者数量庞大且中央管理部门处理能力有限，个体面临的处罚风险通常很小，理性个体不会选择缴纳罚款。本文证明，若中央管理部门以公开已知的顺序处理违法者，便能有效激励他们缴纳罚款。通过理论分析与现实实验，我们展示了该机制如何促进非合作行为并激励个体缴纳罚款。此外，这一结论对任意联盟同样成立。我们量化了中央管理部门预期的总罚款收入，并表明其显著提升。