We study the problem of prediction with expert advice with adversarial corruption where the adversary can at most corrupt one expert. Using tools from viscosity theory, we characterize the long-time behavior of the value function of the game between the forecaster and the adversary. We provide lower and upper bounds for the growth rate of regret without relying on a comparison result. We show that depending on the description of regret, the limiting behavior of the game can significantly differ.

翻译：我们研究用专家建议来预测对抗性腐败的问题,在对抗性腐败的情况下,对手最多可以腐败的一位专家。我们使用粘度理论的工具来描述预测者和对手之间游戏价值功能的长期行为。我们为遗憾的增长率提供了下限和上限,而不必依赖比较结果。我们显示,视遗憾的描述而定,游戏的限制性行为可能大相径庭。