In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs. Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over time. Existing transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) such as EIP-1559, however, do not work in this setting, as EIP-1559 only generates negligible revenue because of burning, while provers often create or purchase specialized hardware in hopes of creating long-term revenue from proving, somewhat reminiscent of proof-of-work miners in the case of chains like Bitcoin. In this paper, we explore the design of transaction fee mechanisms for prover markets. The desiderata for such mechanisms include efficiency (social welfare is maximized), incentive compatibility (it is rational to bid honestly), collusion resistance (no profitable collusion among provers exists), and off-chain agreement proofness (no profitable collusion between users and provers exists). To demonstrate the difficulties of our new setting, we put forward several simple strawman mechanisms, and show they suffer from notable deficiencies.

翻译：在零知识卷叠（ZK-Rollups）中，证明者耗费大量计算资源生成有效性证明。其成本应得到合理补偿，从而形成可持续的证明者市场。然而，现有交易费用机制（如EIP-1559）在此场景下并不适用——EIP-1559因销毁机制仅产生微薄收入，而证明者常需自研或购买专用硬件，以期通过证明服务获取长期收益，这一定程度类似于比特币等链上的工作量证明矿工。本文探索了面向证明者市场的交易费用机制设计。此类机制需满足以下需求：效率（社会福利最大化）、激励相容（诚实报价为理性选择）、抗合谋（证明者间无有利可图的合谋）以及链下协议抗性（用户与证明者间无有利可图的合谋）。为揭示新场景的挑战性，我们提出了若干简单原型机制，并证明其存在显著缺陷。