Who sets the rules for artificial intelligence, and on what terms, has become a defining question of global governance. For several years that contest ran through principles and ethics codes; it now runs through institutions. China's proposed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) is the most consequential recent entrant and the least examined. We place WAICO within the emerging regime complex for AI and argue that its importance lies not in any single commitment but in the position it is designed to hold. Coding a cross-section of fifteen international AI governance instruments and institutions on how they admit members, how they are organized, and what they prioritize, we find that WAICO's proposed design joins three features that no constituted multilateral body currently combines: membership open to any sovereign state, no values or regime-type test for entry, and an agenda built around development and the global capability divide. The incumbent Western-led bodies gate membership by shared values and concentrate on rights and safety; the universal United Nations bodies are open but anchored in human rights; a development-first agenda is otherwise carried by the regional strategies of the Global South. Among constituted institutions, the only occupant of WAICO's intended position is China's own 2023 precursor initiative. We read this as the formation of a second, still-proposed pole in global AI governance, organized around sovereignty and development rather than rights and safety, and argue that WAICO would be the first standing organization built to anchor it. We report the full coding, state testable expectations against which the claim can be judged as the organization takes shape, and release the dataset for replication.

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