We examine the information security practices of Ugandan climate activists protesting the development of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). We conducted five-week fieldwork in Kampala, Uganda, which included interviews with 13 anti-EACOP activists. Through an inductive analysis, we report on the complexities faced by small groups of predominantly student protesters as they covertly organise small-scale anti-EACOP protests within a context marked by state surveillance and repression. Our study points to a multi-layered adversarial landscape, where participants' experiences of direct threats, including arrests and information compromise, and their fears of abduction, shaped their security practices. These practices were rooted in autonomous decision-making within groups. We present a grounded understanding of how participants' need to protect information for their own security, as well as that of others, permeated their lives, leading them to adjust day-to-day aspects of their device management, communication, accommodation, transport and social relations as deliberate tactics to mitigate surveillance.

翻译：我们考察了乌干达气候活动人士在抗议东非原油管道（EACOP）开发过程中的信息安全实践。我们在乌干达坎帕拉开展了为期五周的田野调查，包括对13名反EACOP活动人士的访谈。通过归纳分析，我们揭示了以学生抗议者为主的小规模群体在国家监控与压制背景下，秘密组织小型反EACOP抗议时所面临的复杂性。研究指出一个多层次对抗性环境：参与者遭受逮捕和信息泄露等直接威胁的经历，以及对绑架的恐惧，塑造了他们的安全实践。这些实践植根于团体内部的自主决策。我们呈现了一种扎根理解，即参与者为保护自身及他人安全而保护信息的需求如何渗透其生活，促使他们将设备管理、通信、住宿、交通及社会关系的日常调整作为缓解监控的有意策略。