We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or on recommendation. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The decisions of agents are directly linked to their optimism level since they decide to play if they believe the opponent has a high probability to cooperate. Optimism is precisely tuned by parameters named as optimism threshold and tolerance. Our experiment showed that being optimistic is better as it leads to more accurate judgments whereas acting pessimistic results in biased decisions.

翻译：我们分析过热的囚犯困境的扩大模型,即代理人根据有限的记忆或推荐数据决定玩耍。 合作者可以决定是否与对手玩耍。 代理人的决定与他们的乐观程度直接相关,因为他们认为如果对方认为对方极有可能合作的话,他们决定玩耍。 乐观的精确调和被称为乐观门槛和容忍的参数。 我们的实验表明,乐观会更好,因为它能导致更准确的判断,而采取悲观的态度则会导致偏颇的决定。