This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common interests. Synchronous coordination, characterized by simultaneous commitments, and asynchronous coordination, defined by sequential action timing, are both prevalent in economic contexts such as crowdfunding and fund management. We introduce Monotone Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, MSPNE, to analyze least favorable equilibrium outcomes. We provide a recursive characterization for synchronous coordination and a graph-theoretic representation for asynchronous coordination, demonstrating their equivalence in terms of the greatest implementable outcome. Our results show that the structure of commitment, whether simultaneous or sequential, does not affect the achievable welfare outcome under certain conditions. Additionally, we discuss computational aspects, highlighting the general NP-Hardness of the problem but identifying a significant class of games that are computationally tractable. These findings offer valuable insights for the optimal design of coordination mechanisms.

翻译：本文在具有战略互补性和共同利益的动态博弈中，建立了同步协调机制与异步协调机制之间的等价性。同步协调以同时承诺为特征，而异步协调则由序贯行动时序定义，二者在众筹和基金管理等经济情境中均普遍存在。我们引入单调子博弈完美纳什均衡（MSPNE）来分析最不利的均衡结果。我们为同步协调提供了递归刻画，并为异步协调提供了图论表示，证明二者在最大可实施结果方面具有等价性。我们的结果表明，在特定条件下，承诺的结构——无论是同时还是序贯——并不影响可实现的福利结果。此外，我们讨论了计算层面的问题，指出该问题通常具有NP难性，但识别出了一大类在计算上易于处理的博弈。这些发现为协调机制的最优设计提供了有价值的见解。