A computing device typically identifies itself by exhibiting unique measurable behavior or by proving its knowledge of a secret. In both cases, the identifying device must reveal information to a verifier. Considerable research has focused on protecting identifying entities (provers) and reducing the amount of leaked data. However, little has been done to conceal the fact that the verification occurred. We show how this problem naturally arises in the context of digital emblems, which were recently proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross to protect digital resources during cyber-conflicts. To address this new and important open problem, we define a new primitive, called an Oblivious Digital Token (ODT) that can be verified obliviously. Verifiers can use this procedure to check whether a device has an ODT without revealing to any other parties (including the device itself) that this check occurred. We demonstrate the feasibility of ODTs and present a concrete construction that provably meets the ODT security requirements, even if the prover device's software is fully compromised. We also implement a prototype of the proposed construction and evaluate its performance, thereby confirming its practicality.

翻译：计算设备通常通过展示独特的可测量行为或证明其掌握某个秘密来标识自身。在这两种情况下，标识设备都必须向验证方透露信息。已有大量研究专注于保护标识实体（证明方）并减少泄露的数据量，然而，对于隐藏验证行为发生这一事实的研究却很少。我们展示了该问题如何在国际红十字委员会最近提出的数字徽章背景下自然浮现，该机制旨在网络冲突期间保护数字资源。为解决这一新的重要开放性问题，我们定义了一种称为不经意数字令牌的新原语，该令牌可被不经意地验证。验证方可通过此程序检查设备是否持有ODT，且不会向任何其他方（包括设备自身）泄露此次检查的发生。我们证明了ODT的可行性，并提出了一种具体构造方案，该方案可证明满足ODT的安全要求，即使证明设备的软件完全被攻破。我们还实现了所提构造的原型并评估其性能，从而证实了其实用性。