While quantum computers have the potential to perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the capabilities of classical computers, realizing this potential remains a challenge. One such task is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy. Certified randomness has many applications but is fundamentally impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. In this work, we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations: a client generates quantum "challenge" circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute, and verifies the server's results. We analyze the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of $1.1\times10^{18}$ floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify $71,313$ bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of today's quantum computers.

翻译：尽管量子计算机具备超越经典计算机执行多种实际重要任务的潜力，但实现这一潜力仍面临挑战。其中一项任务是利用不可信的远程设备生成随机比特，并能验证其包含特定熵量。可验证随机性具有诸多应用，但仅依靠经典计算在根本上无法实现。本工作中，我们演示了通过互联网访问的56量子比特Quantinuum H2-1囚禁离子量子计算机生成可验证随机比特的过程。我们的协议基于近期随机电路采样演示的经典计算困难性：客户端使用少量随机种子生成量子“挑战”电路，将其发送至不可信的量子服务器执行，并验证服务器返回的结果。我们针对受限类别的现实近端对手分析了协议的安全性。通过在多台超级计算机上以实测综合持续性能达每秒$1.1\times10^{18}$次浮点运算的经典验证系统，我们在该受限对手及附加假设条件下验证了$71,313$比特的熵。我们的研究成果展现了当前量子计算机向实际应用迈进的一步。