We analyze the structure of the market for foundation models, i.e., large AI models such as those that power ChatGPT and that are adaptable to downstream uses, and we examine the implications for competition policy and regulation. We observe that the most capable models will have a tendency towards natural monopoly and may have potentially vast markets. This calls for a two-pronged regulatory response: (i) Antitrust authorities need to ensure the contestability of the market by tackling strategic behavior, in particular by ensuring that monopolies do not propagate vertically to downstream uses, and (ii) given the diminished potential for market discipline, there is a role for regulators to ensure that the most capable models meet sufficient quality standards (including safety, privacy, non-discrimination, reliability and interoperability standards) to maximally contribute to social welfare. Regulators should also ensure a level regulatory playing field between AI and non-AI applications in all sectors of the economy. For models that are behind the frontier, we expect competition to be quite intense, implying a more limited role for competition policy, although a role for regulation remains.

翻译：本文分析了基础模型（即驱动ChatGPT等应用且可适应下游用途的大型AI模型）的市场结构，并探讨其对竞争政策与监管的启示。我们观察到，最强大的模型具有自然垄断倾向，且可能占据庞大的市场。这需要双管齐下的监管应对：（i）反垄断机构需通过遏制战略性行为（尤其是确保垄断不会纵向传导至下游用途）来保障市场的可竞争性；（ii）鉴于市场约束机制可能失效，监管机构需确保最强大的模型达到足够质量标准（包括安全性、隐私、非歧视性、可靠性与互操作性标准），以最大程度提升社会福利。监管机构还应确保经济各行业中AI与非AI应用享有公平的监管环境。对于前沿水平以下的模型，我们预计竞争将相当激烈，这意味着竞争政策的作用较为有限，但监管仍可发挥作用。