We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in asynchronous distributed systems; here, we consider a synchronous setting with a single active player who may communicate with multiple passive observers in an indeterminate environment. We present a procedure for solving the basic strategy-synthesis problem under regular winning conditions. We present our solution in an abstract framework of games with imperfect information and we split the proof in two conceptual parts: (i) a generic reduction schema from imperfect-information to perfect-information games, and (ii) a specific construction for full-information protocols that satisfies the requirement of the reduction schema.

翻译：我们提出了一种包含显式通信行为的不完美信息博弈模型，其中玩家可向另一玩家揭示其完整观测历史。此类全信息协议在异步分布式系统中较为常见；本文考虑同步环境下单个主动玩家与多个被动观测者在不确定环境中的通信场景。我们提出了在正则获胜条件下求解基本策略合成问题的流程。该解法基于不完美信息博弈的抽象框架，并将证明过程分为两个概念性部分：(i) 从不完美信息博弈到完美信息博弈的通用归约方案，以及(ii) 满足该归约方案要求的全信息协议特定构造。