In blockchain systems, the scarcity of a resource is used as a Sybil protection mechanism. In Proof-of-Work blockchains, that resource is computing power. In the event of a fork, the scarcity of this resource theoretically prevents miners from producing blocks on both branches of a fork. In Proof-of-Stake blockchains, because that resource is token stake, the computational cost of creating a block is negligible. In the event of a fork, and if no specific measures have been taken, rational block producers should extend both branches of the fork. In blockchains with sequential block production, a punishment mechanism known as slashing is often cited as a protection against the nothing-at-stake problem. However, in the context of a blockchain with parallel block production, it seems that slashing is not sufficient against the numerous divergence opportunities. In this paper, we propose a novel protection against the nothing-at-stake problem that takes the most out of BFT and Nakamoto-based consensus. By combining those approaches, we wish to scale up blockchains by allowing parallel block production without reconciliation.

翻译：在区块链系统中，资源的稀缺性被用作女巫攻击保护机制。在工作量证明区块链中，该资源是计算能力。当分叉发生时，资源的稀缺性理论上阻止矿工在分叉的两个分支上同时生产区块。而在权益证明区块链中，由于资源是代币权益，创建区块的计算成本几乎可以忽略不计。因此，在分叉发生时，若未采取特定措施，理性的区块生产者应当同时扩展分叉的两个分支。在具有顺序区块生产的区块链中，被称为“罚没”的惩罚机制常被引作针对“无利害关系”问题的防护措施。然而，在具有并行区块生产的区块链环境下，罚没似乎不足以应对众多分叉机会。本文提出了一种新颖的防御机制，该机制充分结合了拜占庭容错（BFT）与中本聪共识的优势。通过融合这两种方法，我们旨在通过允许无需协调的并行区块生产来扩展区块链的规模。