We propose a mechanism to allocate slots fairly at congested airports. This mechanism: (a) ensures that the slots are allocated according to the true valuations of airlines, (b) provides fair opportunities to the flights connecting remote cities to large airports, and (c) controls the number of flights in each slot to minimize congestion. The mechanism draws inspiration from economic theory. It allocates the slots based on an affine maximizer allocation rule and charges payments to the airlines such that they are incentivized to reveal their true valuations. The allocation also optimizes the occupancy of every slot to keep them as uncongested as possible. The formulation solves an optimal integral solution in strongly polynomial time. We conduct experiments on the data collected from two major airports in India. We also compare our results with existing allocations and also with the allocations based on the International Air Transport Association (IATA) guidelines. The computational results show that the social utility generated using our mechanism is 20-30% higher than IATA and current allocations.

翻译：我们提议了一个在拥挤的机场公平分配空档的机制。这个机制:(a) 确保空档的分配符合航空公司的真正估价;(b) 为连接偏远城市和大型机场的航班提供公平的机会;(c) 控制每个空档的航班数量,以尽量减少拥堵。这个机制从经济理论中得到启发。它根据一个飞速最大化分配规则分配空档,并向航空公司收取款项,以激励航空公司披露其真实价值。这个分配还优化了每个空档的占用,以尽可能保持空档的不叠状态。这个配方在极强的多元时间内解决了最佳的整体解决办法。我们对从印度两个主要机场收集的数据进行实验。我们还将我们的成果与国际航空运输协会(空运协会)准则的现有分配和分配进行比较。计算结果显示,利用我们机制产生的社会效用比空运协会和当前分配高出20-30%。