We study the problem of computing the tightest \(α\)-potential approximation of a general-sum game over continuous action spaces, within a prescribed class of potential functions and when each player has access only to its own utility function. The difficulty is twofold: the approximation error involves a worst-case search over an infinite set of unilateral deviations, and the required utility information is distributed across players. For a linear-in-parameters potential class, we use an exact finite-tuple reformulation that separates the problem into a global outer search over deviation tuples and distributed convex inner problems. We develop a primal--dual inner oracle tailored to this structure and establish a uniform one-sided accuracy guarantee. This oracle can be combined with global outer search to obtain an end-to-end guarantee on the outer optimization error. We also develop a projected zeroth-order outer method as a computationally lighter alternative for higher-dimensional problems. Numerical experiments illustrate the accuracy--computation tradeoff between the two outer-search methods and show that the proposed optimization framework can improve upon analytical \(α\)-potential constructions.

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