A recent paper by Gupta et al. (EuroSys'23) challenged the usefulness of trusted component (TC) based Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols to lower the replica group size from $3f+1$ to $2f+1$, identifying three limitations of such protocols and proposing that TCs should be used instead to improve the performance of BFT protocols. Here, we point out flaws in both arguments and advocate that the most worthwhile use of TCs in BFT protocols is indeed to make them as resilient as crash fault-tolerant (CFT) protocols, which can tolerate up to $f$ faulty replicas using $2f+1$ replicas.

翻译：Gupta等人近期发表的论文（EuroSys'23）质疑了基于可信组件（TC）的拜占庭容错（BFT）协议在将副本组规模从$3f+1$降低至$2f+1$方面的有效性，指出此类协议存在三个局限性，并提出应利用TC来提升BFT协议的性能。本文指出了其论证中的缺陷，并主张TC在BFT协议中最有价值的使用方式，正是使协议具备与崩溃容错（CFT）协议同等的弹性——即使用$2f+1$个副本即可容忍最多$f$个故障副本。