OpenClaw-like agents offer substantial productivity benefits, yet they are insecure by default because they combine untrusted inputs, autonomous action, extensibility, and privileged system access within a single execution loop. We use OpenClaw as an exemplar of a broader class of agents that interact with interfaces, manipulate files, invoke tools, and install extensions in real operating environments. Consequently, their security should be treated as a software engineering problem rather than as a product-specific concern. To address these architectural vulnerabilities, we propose a blueprint for defensible design. We present a risk taxonomy, secure engineering principles, and a practical research agenda to institutionalize safety in agent construction. Our goal is to transition the community focus from isolated vulnerability patching toward systematic defensive engineering and robust deployment practices.

翻译：类OpenClaw智能体虽能显著提升生产效率，但其默认配置存在安全隐患，因其在单一执行循环中同时整合了不可信输入、自主行为、可扩展性及特权系统访问能力。本文以OpenClaw为例，探讨了在真实操作环境中与接口交互、操作文件、调用工具及安装扩展的一类广义智能体。因此，其安全性应被视为软件工程问题，而非特定产品的独立考量。为应对这些架构性漏洞，我们提出可防御式设计蓝图，包括风险分类体系、安全工程原则及旨在将安全性内化为智能体构建标准的研究路线图。我们的目标是将社区关注点从零散漏洞修补转向系统性防御工程与鲁棒部署实践。