In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze, and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks.

翻译：在本文中,我们研究了网络攻击在综合传输和分配(T&D)电网模式中的影响,并结合了分布式能源整合;我们采用了OCTAVE Alegro方法,以确定关键系统资产,列举潜在威胁,分析并优先处理威胁情景的风险;根据分析、攻击策略和开发情景,确定可能导致系统妥协的情况;具体地说,我们调查了数据完整性袭击在反向太阳能光电控制器中的影响;控制信号阻断保护开关和断开器中的攻击;协调监测和转换时滞攻击。