RowHammer stands out as a prominent example, potentially the pioneering one, showcasing how a failure mechanism at the circuit level can give rise to a significant and pervasive security vulnerability within systems. Prior research has approached RowHammer attacks within a static threat model framework. Nonetheless, it warrants consideration within a more nuanced and dynamic model. This paper presents a low-overhead DRAM RowHammer vulnerability profiling technique termed DRAM-Profiler, which utilizes innovative test vectors for categorizing memory cells into distinct security levels. The proposed test vectors intentionally weaken the spatial correlation between the aggressors and victim rows before an attack for evaluation, thus aiding designers in mitigating RowHammer vulnerabilities in the mapping phase. While there has been no previous research showcasing the impact of such profiling to our knowledge, our study methodically assesses 128 commercial DDR4 DRAM products. The results uncover the significant variability among chips from different manufacturers in the type and quantity of RowHammer attacks that can be exploited by adversaries.

翻译：RowHammer作为突出的范例（可能具有开创性），展示了电路层面的失效机制如何引致系统内重大且普遍的安全漏洞。以往研究多在静态威胁模型框架下探讨RowHammer攻击，但仍有必要将其置于更为精细的动态模型中加以考量。本文提出一种低开销的DRAM RowHammer漏洞评估技术，名为DRAM-Profiler，该技术利用创新测试向量将存储单元划分为不同安全等级。所提出的测试向量在攻击评估前有意削弱攻击行与受害行之间的空间关联性，从而在设计映射阶段协助缓解RowHammer漏洞。尽管据我们所知此前尚无研究展示此类评估的作用，但本研究系统性地评估了128款商用DDR4 DRAM产品。结果表明，不同制造商芯片在攻击者可利用的RowHammer攻击种类与数量上存在显著差异。